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THE IMPACT OF THE LAWYERS: AN INFORMAL APPRAISAL
DALE V. BROEDERt
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is based upon data which the author acquired during the
mid-1950's while participating in the University of Chicago Jury Proj-
ect.' The appraisal of the impact of lawyers is drawn from personal ob-
t Member, Michigan and Illinois Bars. The author is deeply indebted to Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., of the University of Chicago Law School, the Jury Project Director,
for his many helpful comments and suggestions.
1. In July 1966 the first major work resulting from the University of Chicago
Jury Project was published. KALVEN & ZEIsEL, AMERICAN JURY (1966). There have,
of course, been numerous previous Project publications. See, e.g., ZEIsEL, KALVEN &
BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS (1959). Yet, the volume by Kalven and Zeisel dwarfs
anything previously written on the jury.
For Jury Project data generally, see Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the
University of Chicago Law School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368 (1957) ; Kalven, Report on
the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND
METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 155 (U. Mich. Law School 1957). See also Meltzer,
A Projected Study of the Jury as a Working Institution, 287 ANNALS Ac. OF POL. & Soc.
Sc. 97 (1953).
Other Jury Project publications include Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50
VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964) ; Kalven, A General Analysis of and Introduction to the Prob-
lem of Court Congestion and Delay, ABA SECT. INS. N. & C. L. 322 (1963) ; Kalven,
The Bar, The Court, and The Delay, 328 ANNALS Ac. OF POL. & Soc. Sc. 37 (1960)
Kalven, Zeisel & Buchholz, Delay in the Court, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 104 (1960);
Kalven, The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158 (1958), reprinted in 7 U. CHI. L.S. REc. 6 (1958) ; Strodtbeck, Social Process, The
Law and Jury Functioning, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 144 (Evan ed. 1962) ; Zeisel & Cal-
lahan, Split Trials and Timesaving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606
(1963) ; Zeisel, Splitting Liability and Danmge Issue Saves 20 Per Cent of the Court's
Time, ABA SECT. INS. N. & C.L. 328 (1963) ; Zeisel, Social Research on the Law: The
Ideal and the Practical, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 124 (Evan ed. 1962) ; Zeisel, The Jury
and the Court Delay, 328 ANNALS Ac. OF POL. & Soc. Sc. 46 (1960) ; Zeisel, Kalven &
Buchholz, Is the Trial Bar a Cause of Delayf, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 17 (1959).
In addition, a Jury Project volume on the impact of the Durham Ride, SIMON, THE
JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, is scheduled for publication late this fall. Com-
pare Arens, Granfield & Susan, Jurors, Jury Charges and Insanity, 14 CATH. U.L. REV.
1 (1965). Durham v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1956), of course, holds
that the criminal insanity test is "mental disease or defect." See generally De Grazia,
The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CII. L. REV. 339 (1955).
Finally, a book on the civil jury, ZEISEL, KALVEN & CALLAHAN, THE JURY, THE
JUDGE, AND THE CIVIL CASE, will be published in 1967.
As regards the author's own published Jury Project work, see Broeder, The Impact
of the "Scapegoat" in Jury Trials: Some Tentative Insights (current issue of DUQUESNE
L. REV. - (1966) ; Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plaintiff Insurance
Companies in Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case Study, 6 NAT. RES. J.
269 (1966) ; Broeder, The Impact of the Vincinage Requirement: An Empirical Look,
45 NEn. L. REV. 99 (1966) ; Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19; Broeder,
Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 1965 INS. L.J. 138, reprinted in
PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 656 (1965); Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias As
Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1079 (1965);
Broeder, Plaintiff's Family Status As Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative In-
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servation of 23 consecutively tried jury trials, 16 civil and 7 criminal, in
a midwestern federal district court. Necessarily, all actual names and
places mentioned herein have been changed.2 All of the trials were ob-
served from beginning to end and rapport was maintained throughout the
study period with the presiding trial judge and all court personnel. With
the court's permission, 225 of the jurors were interviewed shortly after
the trial at their homes or places of business. The average juror-interview
ran two and one-half hours. Close contact was also maintained with
most of the trial lawyers. According to the 1950 census, the approximate
population of each of the three cities in which court was held was 120,000.
The author was privileged to be associated with the Jury Project
from 1953 to 1956 and periodically thereafter. Hopefully, most of the
author's relatively minor contributions to the Project will ultimately ap-
pear as part of a final eclectic Jury Project volume now scheduled for
publication in 1967. This in any event is the current plan.'
To draw an accurate picture of the difference the lawyers made in
the cases studied is impossible. Obviously lawyers made a difference
but much of it was due to the way in which they prepared, the witnesses
they found, the depositions they took, and the advice they gave to their
clients and witnesses. The effect of such moves-and even their exis-
tence-could not often be determined. Frequently, a juror could not ex-
press his reactions to the lawyer apart from his reactions to the case itself.
Yet something of importance can be said. Many of the jurors did react
to the lawyers and often stated that such reactions probably affected their
thinking. A description of these reactions and of the diverse and fre-
quently unobvious ways in which the lawyers' personalities and styles
became important constitutes the major portion of what follows. This,
after all, is what popularly is meant by talk of the lawyers' influence and
the story even so confined contains many surprises. At times we were
able to go further and to show the impact of some move which the jurors
did not even associate with a lawyer or of which they could not possibly
have known.
sights, 14 J. PUB. L. 131 (1965) ; Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical
Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1965), reprinted in 3 Mon. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 270
(1965) ; Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959) ;
Broeder, The Jury Project, S.D.B.J., Oct. 1957, p. 133; Broeder, The Functions of the
Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954).
See also Broeder, Jury, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 205 (1963 ed.).
2. However, with a few minor exceptions, the various name and place changes have
been kept constant throughout the author's various Project publications.
3. The author's largest single unpublished contribution to the Project consists of
an exhaustive study of a single wrongful death action brought for the benefit of a young
trucker's widow and her two baby girls.
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The materials will be discussed in three parts. First dealt with are
those cases where the jurors' reactions to the lawyers almost certainly
affected their thinking on the merits. While the factors apparently re-
sponsible for the jurors' feelings are generally noted, the major purpose
here is simply to show the number of cases and the variety of ways in
which the jurors could fairly be said to have "tried the lawyers." The
second part of the discussion is concerned with what the jurors said they
liked or disliked about the lawyers with no particular regard for the im-
portance of such likes and dislikes. The essay concludes with a represen-
tative sampling of what to the author appear to have been the lawyers'
most successful and blundersome moves.
The inquiry here primarily is directed not to what the jurors thought
about the lawyers, but rather to the actual way in which the lawyers seem
to have influenced the final result, even, for example, by allowing the
time for appeal to run out or by settling for a clearly excessive or inade-
quate amount. While data such as are reflected by these examples are
not peculiar to jury trials, they are significant and provide a valuable
additional perspective for assessing the lawyers' importance.
II. OBVIOUS LAWYER INFLUENCE ON JURORS
Liking or disliking a lawyer solely because of his personality and
performance at the trial was a material factor affecting juror voting be-
havior in at least nine of the civil and three of the criminal cases studied.
This estimate, furthermore, is conservative; one or two additional cases
might arguably have been included and the figures take no account of the
instances where juror behavior was affected by personal friendship with
a lawyer or by knowing of his reputation. The data, in other words,
strongly suggest that jurors do, to a significant degree, try the lawyers
right along with their clients' cases. It must be emphasized that at this
point we are concerned solely with cases where the impact of the lawyer
as a person demonstrably affected juror behavior, not with cases where
it might have. Only the major factors shaping the jurors' feelings with
respect to the lawyers are noted at this time. The finer points are sub-
sequently developed.
A. Civil Cases
Drake, an action brought under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, perhaps best illustrates the type of situation. Plaintiff was a sixty-
five-year-old unskilled laborer, an obviously sick man who had not
worked since the accident several years before the trial. Defendant was
a large railroad. Liability was virtually conceded by defendant; the de-
fense was that plaintiff's various claimed ailments were not the result of
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the accident. Defendant was represented by two lawyers, Faust, who
did the vast bulk of the work, and Newell, a local attorney, who con-
ducted the voir dire examination of the jury and spoke for the last fif-
teen minutes of defendant's allotted closing argument time. No juror
liked Newell; some jurors disliked him intensely. Three factors were
mentioned: (1) his protracted (zis-a-vis' plaintiff's counsel) voir dire
examination; (2) his "rudeness" to the judge when reprimanded for
misstating the law on voir dire and for repetitious and improper ques-
tioning of the veniremen; and (3) his "highly uncalled-for" closing
argument. But the "uncalled-for" argument overshadowed all else so
far as the jurors were concerned:
Mr. Drake is just like an old red heifer. You farmers on
the jury know all about old red heifers. They don't have any
value until they're hit by a railroad train. Then their value
skyrockets. That's just the way it is with Mr. Drake. The
only reason his lawyer tells you he's worth so much is that he's
been hit by a train. Mr. Drake ought to be down at the animal
husbandry department at the university where I understand
they're experimenting with old red heifers.
As Newell spoke it was almost embarrassing to be present in the
courtroom; plaintiff's counsel did little to improve things by comment-
ing that Newell's remark showed the jury what had been evident to him
for a long time, that defendant could not "tell the difference between an
animal and a human being." The jurors, almost to a man, were incensed
with Newell's argument. Particularly was this true of the industrial
workers who identified with plaintiff, and the farmers and farm wives
who resented the inference that Newell thought them crooked. The "red
heifer" analogy was referred to several times in the deliberations as a rea-
son for increasing damages and almost all jurors agreed that the remark
cost defendant dearly. Indeed, two jurors, who favored extremely low
damages vis-a-vis' their colleagues, said that their dislike of Newell, par-
ticularly on account of his argument, was a major factor in causing them
to agree to the $25,000 verdict. In the opinion of the judge, the clerk,
the law clerk as well as every other disinterested lawyer in the courtroom,
the verdict was excessive by some $23,000.
The situation in Thomas, another FELA case, was more compli-
cated. Plaintiff was a middle-aged locomotive engineer seeking recovery
for a knee injury against the XYZ Ry. Co. Liability was sharply con-
tested but the main defense was that plaintiff was a malingerer and that
he, his lawyer, and most of plaintiff's witnesses were guilty of fraud and
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conspiracy. Plaintiff's counsel, in turn, charged that defendant's star
witness had committed perjury. The lawyers engaged in numerous bit-
ter personal exchanges throughout the trial and to a material degree tried
each other as much if not more than the issues. Defense counsel, for ex-
ample, kept making sinister references to the fact that plaintiff's counsel
came from another state, "a city slicker imported to tell you a cooked up
story." Plaintiff's counsel retorted that he had never faced such a dis-
reputable opponent. And so it went, throughout the trial. Indeed, the
judge came close to citing defense counsel for contempt on two occasions
and both lawyers, but particularly defense counsel, were repeatedly
reprimanded.
In view of the situation, it is hardly surprising to find that many of
the jurors were greatly influenced by their respective (and conflicting)
reactions to the lawyers. In none of the cases studied did the jurors as a
whole so clearly identify a litigant's case with his lawyer. All but four
jurors seemed to have been in some degree affected. Statements such as
the following were typical: "I wanted Holliday [plaintiff's counsel] to
win." "I wanted to see that city slicker [Holliday] get what was coming
to him," and at least five jurors (the four jurors favoring the highest
damage awards and the juror most vigorously opposed to any recovery),
expressly admitted that their attitudes towards the lawyers materially in-
fluenced their thinking on how they should vote. Interestingly, too, the
four pro-plaintiff jurors just referred to expressed great regret at Holli-
day's failure to be present at the rendition of the verdict. They wanted
to apologize for consenting to "such a low verdict" and to assure Holli-
day that its inadequacy was no reflection on his superb handling of the
case, being instead due to the "stubborn and unreasoning" attitudes of the
pro-defendant jurors.
Mrs. Brill, however, the strongest pro-defendant juror, detested
Holliday, largely because of his "continual picking on" defense counsel
Blankner with whom she was infatuated. The extent of this infatuation
and its probable effect upon Mrs. Brill's thinking can readily be discerned
from the following excerpt from her personal interview:
I really liked Mr. Blankner. I thought he did as good a
j.ob under the circumstances, in view of the tactics of Mr. Holli-
day, as any lawyer could have done. On top of that I liked him
personally. He comes from a fine . . . [local] family and
although I don't know him or any of his family, I know they
have a fine reputation. As I saw it, it was a trial between the
smooth city slicker, represented by Holliday, and the poor local
boy, Mr. Blankner, and I pulled for the poor local boy.
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Would you like to know what a woman juror thinks about
a lawyer? Well, Mr. Blankner struck me as the kind of man
whose wife doesn't take very good care of him. I wanted to
take a needle and thread and sew up his pants, right there in
the courtroom. They were just too long, and they hung down
over his shoes like gunny sacks. And then his shoes were never
shined. I felt like shaking him or putting my arm around him
and telling him to shine his shoes. And then I think he wore
the same shirt throughout the trial. His wife apparently does
nothing for him. I wondered what kind of home life he had.
The remaining civil cases may be disposed of more briefly. The
two jurors favoring the highest awards in Field, a wrongful death action,
expressly stated that their reluctance to consent to the verdict was in ma-
terial part due to a feeling that the reputation of plaintiff's counsel would
be adversely affected by an award substantially lower than the sum he
had requested. These jurors, both of whom played dominant roles in the
deliberations, had little use for defendant or its counsel but thought very
highly of plaintiff's counsel. Peters, an action involving a plaintiff-
pedestrian suing an individual motorist, was similar. Two jurors stated
that they had initially favored plaintiff on account of their reluctance to
find against plaintiff's lawyer. Plaintiff's counsel was young and com-
paratively inexperienced, and the jurors in question very much disliked
seeing him lose.
Rose, a wrongful death action, is more unique. Defense counsel, in
arguing damages, simply made the point that deceased was a drunkard;
that his wife (for whose benefit the action was brought) and he were
separated at the time of the accident, and that he rarely, if ever, con-
tributed anything to her support. "In short," said defense counsel, "his
life wasn't worth very much." Four jurors felt nothing but ill-will
against defendant on account of this remark and one of them-a re-
ligious truckdriver-was enraged. This juror, who held out for a plain-
tiff's verdict for several hours, said that one of his principal reasons for
doing so was the callousness of defense counsel as reflected by his above-
quoted remark. "I hope and pray that God will forgive him for saying
that and for not realizing that we're all equal in the eyes of God." Argu-
ing the pecuniary losses for defendant in a wrongful death action, it
would appear, is often a very delicate undertaking.
A somewhat similar situation involving a defense counsel likewise
played a material part in Grey. Defendant was a trucking company;
plaintiff an attractive divorcee who worked on an assembly line for Elec-
tronics, Inc., a large local industrial concern. Several jurors said that
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they increased the verdict award because of their irritation with defense
counsel for having secured certain x-rays of plaintiff's chest from her
Electronics company physician who had treated her for chest pains prior
to the accident. One of plaintiff's complaints at the trial was "a jammed
up feeling in my chest, ever since the accident." The jurors in question-
a few of whom either worked or had worked for Electronics, Inc.-sim-
ply could not forgive defense counsel for having induced the company
physician to betray his patient. "Those examinations are supposed to be
secret. There was no excuse for such conduct [by defense counsel]."
Ford #2 and Phillips #4i are best discussed together. Ford
-#2 was a case in which neither side made an objection, where counsel
treated one another with the utmost respect and politeness, and where the
arguments were reserved and almost (if not wholly) devoid of emotion.
The principal claim was for property damage to plaintiff's truck, stipu-
lated to be $5,000. Plaintiff's injuries were minor. Generally speaking,
the jurors did not like the tea-party atmosphere; it did not comport with
their notions of how a lawsuit should be tried. But the reactions in the
case of at least two jurors, both who initially voted for defendant, went
much deeper. Their idea was that defense counsel was intentionally lying
down in return for a percentage of the verdict and that he, the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's lawyer, were engaged in a conspiracy to defraud de-
fendant and/or defendant's insurance company. The fact that the dam-
ages were stipulated appeared to them to give substance to their notion.
"In an honestly contested case, the lawyers don't agree on anything."
Consequently the jurors believed that the verdict should be for defendant;
that the lawyers could not be trusted. Though one of these jurors changed
his vote shortly after the start of the deliberations, the other held out for
defendant for hours and came close to hanging the jury.
Phillips #i, while similar to Ford #2 in that some of the jurors
felt that a conspiracy was afoot, is more complex. There was a substan-
tial personal injury claim and large stipulated property damages. Through-
out the trial plaintiff's counsel ineffectually sought to keep from the
jury the facts that the property-damage claims were actually owned by
certain insurance companies and that plaintiff already had been partially
compensated by an insurance company for his personal injuries. This,
however, was an impossible task, as defense counsel repeatedly, albeit
indirectly, made the jury aware of the insurance companies' interest. In
the end plaintiff's counsel gave up and told the jury himself. But the
4. The Ford and Phillips cases were both tried twice. Hence the designations #1
and #2 are used. The first Ford trial ended in a hung jury, the second in a plaintiff's
verdict. The first Phillips jury found for defendant. A circuit court of appeals re-
versed and the second trial resulted in a large verdict for plaintiffs.
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conspiracy label had already been affixed to him and he was disliked be-
cause of his attempts to keep such "important data" out of the trial.'
There seems little doubt that the defendant's verdict which resulted was
due in large measure to the jurors' adverse reaction to the tactics of plain-
tiff's counsel. One juror, the only one ever voting for plaintiff, likewise
charged that some of the jurors were prejudiced against plaintiff because
his counsel was Jewish. Whether her charge was accurate, however,
could not be determined. The probability is that it was not. The verdict
for defendant, incidentally, was later set aside because of the jury's in-
consistent answers to certain special interrogatories.
The last civil case to be noted is Phillips #2. Mrs. Ring, a doctor's
wife, detested plaintiff's counsel and seems unquestionably to have voted
for defendant, in part, on account of this feeling. Though she assigned
numerous reasons for her reaction, the chief ones appear to have been
that he was "far too cocky," "far too smooth," and that he had made a
complete fool of one of defendant's medical witnesses, a prominent local
radiologist and a respected acquaintance and colleague of her husband's.
"My heart just bled for poor Dr. Johnson; he [plaintiff's counsel] had
no business treating him like that! Why Dr. Johnson was shaking all
over, he was so nervous." Adverse reaction to the counsel representing
the one defendant who had received a favorable verdict in Phillips 42,
however, was more widespread. Indeed, he was almost uniformly re-
garded with contempt and the two jurors initially voting for liability
said that they did so in part because of their reactions. A typical com-
ment follows:
He was terrible. I don't see how he ever got out of law
school. What a spectacle; he was a disgrace to the legal pro-
fession. He ranted, raved, shouted and never said anything
and what he did say you couldn't understand, he had such a
peculiar and confused way of speaking. I wouldn't hire that
fellow to represent me on a traffic ticket in the magistrate's
court.
B. Criminal Cases
Turning now to the criminal cases, it should first of all be noted
that two involved no substantial possibility of an acquittal. Proof of de-
fendant's guilt in Goodman and Williams was overpowering and there
5. On the wisdom or the lack thereof in keeping such data from the jury, see the
provocative debate in Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157 (1954) ; Gay,
"Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEX L. REV. 368 (1956) ; Green, A Rebuttal,
34 TEX. L. REV. 382 (1956). See also GREGOR & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 680-88 (1959).
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were no extenuating circumstances. Government counsel merely had to
introduce the evidence to gain convictions. For the present purpose, then,
these cases may be put to one side. This leaves us with Meyer, Brown,
Ward, Cooper and Johnson and the jurors reactions to the lawyers as per-
sons seem to have played an important role in all but the first two.
Cooper is the most interesting of the cases in this regard. Defendant
was charged under the Mann Act with transporting his wife, Bonnie, an
admitted prostitute, to engage in prostitution. The defense was that
defendant did not have the alleged intent, that he had always opposed his
wife's vocation; that he made the interstate journey chiefly to secure
legitimate employment; that he had taken an advertising sales job shortly
after the journey and had been extremely successful; that Bonnie had
forever forsaken prostitution, and that he had adopted Bonnie's two il-
legitimate children and was taking steps to ensure that they were raised
as devout Catholics. The jurors' dislike of government counsel and his
strategy was a material factor in bringing about defendant's acquittal.
In all, five factors were mentioned. First, government counsel had no
business ridiculing defendant's employer, a respectable businessman who
testified concerning defendant's business acumen and success. This
"disrespectful" attitude of counsel particularly outraged the businessmen
jurors. Second, several jurors resented counsel's "unnecessarily rude"
examination of Bonnie. "She wasn't on trial; I don't see that there was
any reason for making her tell all of the gory past details and making
her cry." Third, many jurors felt counsel's argument that the church
had nothing to offer persons like defendant and Bonnie to be singularly
inappropriate. "That's what the Church is for." This reaction was
especially pronounced in the case of one juror, a woman, whose son was
a minister. Fourth, two jurors, both Catholic, felt that counsel, in ridi-
culing defendant's inability to give the proper name of the particular
church in which the children were undergoing instruction, was making a
"slurring reference to the Catholic Church." Defendant only knew the
church by its common name, "The Cathedral," which was the only name
by which these jurors knew it. "His [counsel's] attitude was inexcus-
able. That really prejudiced me against the government's case." Fi-
nally, one juror, strongly defendant-prone, was irritated with counsel for
seeking to reopen the government's case in order to establish that de-
fendant had been convicted of assault and battery many years before.
"That was an obvious attempt to prejudice us; instead, it prejudiced me
against [counsel] . . . and the government."
The data from Johnson, a Dyer Act case, likewise strongly bears the
imprint of counsel's personality-in this instance, defense counsel's.
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Without exception, the jurors had great respect and admiration for de-
fense counsel and considered him to be extremely personable. "He was
a dogged fighter and a sincere one; he believed in his own case. And
he showed real ability, even though he was so young." This was a typi-
cal comment. The jurors did not point to any particular thing the lawyer
did; he was just "very likeable" and "sincere" and a man who "fought
hard for his client." If there was any one factor, it was counsel's youth
in relation to his performance, which, in the judgment of disinterested
lawyers present at the trial, was outstanding. The probable impact of
counsel's personality on the verdict is perhaps most dramatically illus-
trated by the comments of the jury foreman when asked "what . . . [he]
liked most about the trial." He replied: "I enjoyed watching . . . de-
fense counsel's face when we returned our verdict of 'not guilty.' That
was alone worth all the fighting in the deliberations. What a fine young
man he was and a wonderful lawyer, too." The deliberations, incident-
ally, were extremely bitter and lasted more than six hours. Not so in-
cidentally, the jurors' praise went to a court-appointed attorney who
served without compensation. The comment of government counsel, af-
ter hearing the verdict, is illuminating: "If we had fewer court-appointed
attorneys maybe we'd get some convictions around here; those . . . kids
work too . . . hard; besides, the juries naturally sympathize with them."
The data from Ward, a larceny case, while extremely meager because
only four jurors were personally interviewed, nevertheless strongly sug-
gests the materiality of the jurors' favorable reaction to counsel for the
defense. The jury hung nine to three for conviction. Two minority
jurors interviewed were practically boundless in their enthusiasm, one of
them, to be sure, in large part on account of her personal friendship with
defense counsel, as is fully discussed elsewhere.6 The nature of the com-
ments of these two jurors leaves little doubt as to the importance of
counel's personal influence. So far as these jurors were concerned, de-
fense counsel was on trial as well as defendant and they were not going
to allow his reputation to be sullied with a defeat. Retrial of defendant
before another jury, it should be noted, resulted in an acquittal.
III. POSSIBLE LAWYER INFLUENCE ON JURORS
Thus far, we have been dealing with cases where jurors were ob-
viously affected by their reactions to the lawyers and where, for the most
part, it could in a general way readily be determined why they were af-
fected. To go beyond this, to cases where the lawyers' personalities had
6. See Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An Empirical Look, 45
NEB. L. REV. 99, 110, 114 (1966).
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no reasonably certain impact and to a description of precisely why it was
that Juror Jones did not like Lawyer Smith, is extremely difficult and in
large measure impossible. Frequently the jurors were unable to state
meaningfully why they liked or disliked a particular lawyer and/or
whether or not they were influenced by their feelings. Often, too, the
right questions were simply not asked. Finally, available data are diffi-
cult to present because of the jurors' often sharply conflicting reactions
to a particular lawyer and/or his strategy. What follows, then, is a
rough attempt to describe generally those aspects of the lawyer's be-
havior which prima facie might seem important and/or which were most
often referred to by the jurors as shaping their opinions of the lawyers.
In large part, the data reveals those things which the jurors indicated
they did not like about the lawyers. The data is pitifully inadequate, how-
ever, on the question of what the jurors liked.
A. Objections
"Excessive objecting" was not the factor which, at the outset of the
study, it was thought likely to prove.7 In the first place, the threshold of
juror tolerance of objections was very high. The jurors generally ex-
pected the lawyers to object. Indeed, some of the jurors were dis-
appointed that there were not more objections. In one case, as we have
seen,8 the failure of the lawyers to object and wrangle over the evidence
was taken by two jurors as evidence of a lawyer conspiracy to defraud
defendant and/or its insurance company. Johnson, a Dyer Act case, is
also illuminating in this regard. Several jurors referred to defense coun-
sel's vigorous objections to certain (obviously prejudicial and irrelevant)
evidence as one of the reasons they liked and admired him. A final il-
lustration is afforded by Field, a six-day wrongful death action trial in
which defense counsel were seemingly always on their feet objecting and
making a record. Though the jurors rapidly tired of this, there was
nevertheless a strong undercurrent of feeling that counsel were only do-
ing the usual and that such strategy was to be expected. Indeed, several
jurors respected the strategy notwithstanding that they did not like it and
there was a slight touch of admiration for chief defense counsel in the
joke shared by the jurors that he was the "most objectionable man that
ever lived." In sum, he was respected for his ability "to think up so
many objections and assign reasons for them."
The point just made, however, is easily overstated. Certainly most
jurors serving on cases involving numerous objections grew extremely
7. The impact of "objecting" constituted the bases for one of the many experi-
mental jury designs undertaken by the Project.
8. See text at note 4 supra.
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tired of the practice and some jurors became positively resentful. Espe-
cially was this true where they could see no valid ground for the objec-
tion or where, though they could or thought they could divine it, were
unable to see what difference the objected-to evidence would make. In
such cases, as one might expect, a lawyer's excessive objecting was often
assigned as a reason for disliking him. There was a feeling in such cases
that the objections were solely or largely designed either to confuse the
issues or needlessly to drag out the trial. Business and professional per-
ons were the most critical in this regard. The data are also persuasive
that a lawyer who objects but less frequently than his opponent gains
stature in the jurors' eyes as does one who "politely" desists from offer-
ing evidence after an objection has been interposed, thus "saving time
and avoiding a battle of personalities." This latter reaction was particu-
larly apparent in Field' where plaintiff's counsel asked numerous ques-
tions which seemed expressly designed to evoke objections and then with-
drew them as soon as the expected objection was forthcoming. In gen-
eral, the jurors fell for counsel's strategy.
Moving away from the "picayune-type" objection to the kind in-
tended to keep out important evidence, the situation is quite different.
With the exception of Phillips #I, where plaintiff's counsel was disliked
in large part because of his frequent but ultimately unsuccessful attempts
to preclude mention of certain insurance company subrogees, 0 no instance
was found of a juror disliking a lawyer merely for objecting to what
fairly might be regarded as "important evidence." To be sure, the jurors
did not generally like such objections, but they scarcely held it against
the lawyer for making them. In some instances, however, the jurors
expressed the view that the making of such an objection caused them
either to attach more importance to the objected-to evidence than they
probably would otherwise have done or, where the objection was sus-
tained, to draw an unfavorable inference against the side making the
objection. Thus in the Rose wrongful death action, 1 for example, most
jurors said that the unsuccessful objections of plaintiff's counsel to evi-
dence tending to show that plaintiff's intestate was drunk at the time of
the accident caused them to give such evidence greater weight. A similar
result obtained in Field from defense counsel's abortive attempt to pre-
clude plaintiff's counsel from introducing a hotel registration card for
the purpose of showing the amount of sleep of defendant's employee just
prior to the accident. Numerous similar instances appear in the data.
9. Field is the wrongful death action mentioned in note 3 supra.
10. See text at note 5 supra. See also note 4 supra.
11. The Rose case is discussed earlier in the text.
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Thus in certain criminal cases the jurors thought the worst of defendant
where defense counsel was successful in keeping his client's criminal
record from being etablished.
In concluding these informal comments, one final point deserves
mention. Jurors sometimes draw wild inferences from the making of an
objection. Thomas, an FELA action, probably affords the best example.
There plaintiff's counsel successfully objected to the admission of certain
x-rays purporting to be x-rays of plaintiff's knee. The basis for the ob-
jection was simply that no proper foundation had been laid, defense coun-
sel for some reason having been unable to produce the doctor who took
the x-rays. From this, several jurors drew the inference that defense
counsel was deceitful in seeking to palm off x-rays of someone else's
knee as the x-rays of plaintiff's knee and that the judge caught him in
the act. Defense counsel, of course, would have been well advised to
explain to the jury precisely what had happened. In this connection two
of the criminal cases studied where defendant failed to take the stand are
illuminating. Defense counsel in each case told the jury to blame him
and not his client for such failure, the upshot being that the jurors did
not really blame anybody, though they did, to be sure, speculate upon the
reasons for counsel's decision.
Somewhat similar to Thomas was the situation in Brown, a Dyer
Act case where defense counsel, with an expression of surprise, vigorously
objected to the admission of certain incriminating letters allegedly writ-
ten by defendant until he had a chance to examine them thoroughly. A
recess was declared for this purpose. From this, the jurors inferred
(perhaps correctly) that defendant had failed to tell his lawyer of the
letters' existence. What hurt defendant, however, was the next step in
the jurors' reasoning: A defendant who fails to disclose everything to his
lawyer is more likely to be guilty than one who does. The point was
repeatedly made during the deliberations and by the jurors during their
personal interviews.
B. Closing Arguments
As one might suppose, the jurors liked and disliked a great many
things about the closing arguments. The "red heifer" argument in
Drake, 2 and the ridicule with which government counsel in Cooper 3
treated defendant's claim that he was raising his wife's illegitimate chil-
dren as devout Catholics, have been discussed previously. The data pro-
12. The Drake case is discussed earlier in the text.
13. The Cooper case is discussed earlier in the text.
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vide numerous other examples. The Grey 4 jurors, for example, resented
the references of plaintiff's counsel to that "invisible third force" (de-
fendant's insurance company); his comment that defendant "wouldn't
have to pay the bill," and his statement that he was sorry he had "only
requested $15,000 in damages." Such "direct references" to the ques-
tion of defendant's insurance and ability to pay were regarded as in "bad
taste." The jurors wanted more subtlety. Several of the Thomas"
jurors resented the way in which plaintiff's counsel argued damages, by
hurriedly assigning arbitrary amounts for items referred to as "the pri-
mary injury," pain and suffering and wage losses, writing them on a
blackboard and then, purporting to add them, arriving at an ultimate
damage request many thousand dollars in excess of the sum of the various
individual figures he had selected. A similar reaction obtained in Sutter
(a personal injury action against a large trucking company) toward
plaintiff counsel's use of a blackboard. Counsel wrote on a blackboard
each of plaintiff's various injuries, which he bluntly designated as "leg,"
"arm," "head," "back" and so on, and assigned to each an arbitrary
figure without explanation. "Imagine, writing 'leg,' and then listing a
figure; and then 'arm.' It was a ridiculous exhibition. That was no
way to talk about the question. Besides, we could see that . . . [plain-
tiff] was badly injured; he [counsel] should have talked about liability
instead of trying to enlist our sympathy, and in such a crude way."
16
Nor did the jurors in Peters (where plaintiff-pedestrian was struck
by defendant's family car) like the fact that plaintiff's counsel cried
while describing his client's injuries-"obvious emotionalism, a grown
man, crying there in front of us like a big baby." Defense counsel in
Cooper, a Mann Act case, strutted around like a big ostrich, got too close
to the jury box when he spoke and "made us feel almost like we were on
trial." One of defense counsel in Goodman, a Dyer Act case, spoke "like
he had mush in his mouth; you couldn't understand a thing he said."
Little would be gained by listing other juror complaints except to
note what was doubtless the most common of all-"the straying away
from the facts," the "failure of the lawyers to get right down to the
14. The Grey case is discussed earlier in the text.
15. The Thomas case is discussed earlier in the text.
16. There is, of course, considerable case law and a vast amount of legal literature
on the wisdom and/or legal propriety of permitting plaintiff's counsel in personal injury
cases to employ mathematical formulae in arguing damages, particularly as regards pain
and suffering. See, e.g., Duguay v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 182 A.2d 451 (1962) ; com-
pare Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). See generally Keeton,
Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463, 466-67 (1962) ; Lambert,
Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47, 68
(1960). And see Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958).
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evidence. They talked too much in generalities." A close runner-up was
the objection, so often raised to the arguments of plaintiff's counsel in
civil and of defense counsel in criminal cases, that "he was overly emo-
tional." Here, however, there is an important caveat. A fairly high
threshold of tolerance for emotionalism was present in the case of many
jurors and a fair number would doubtless have been disappointed had
there been less of it. A lawyer who struck many as a "windbag" would
for others be "entertaining," "a typical lawyer doing just about what
you would expect."
It was difficult to obtain specific data on precisely what the jurors
liked about the closing arguments. The following must suffice as il-
lustrative of the data as obtainable. Praise was forthcoming most of all
for the "tightly reasoned," "down to earth" argument, the kind predi-
cated on the evidence and largely devoid of emotion. The jurors like-
wise placed a high premium on a lawyer's politeness to his opponent dur-
ing closing argument. In the Field wrongful death action, and again in
Thomas (FELA), for example, most jurors looked very favorably upon
a lawyer's express exoneration of his adversary in connection with a
general charge of skullduggery which he had leveled at the adversary's
client and witnesses. "That was very gentlemanly of . . . [them] under
the circumstances." There was a mixed reaction to the strategy adopted
by plaintiff's counsel in Phillips #217 of appealing to the supposed occu-
pational expertise of particular jurors in connection with certain technical
questions the jury had to decide. Some of the jurors enjoyed being
singled out by name; others exceedingly resented the practice. There
was, however, uniform approval of the stratagem followed by defense
counsel in several of the personal injury cases of expressing great sym-
pathy for plaintiff's injuries before turning to the "manifest weaknesses"
of plaintiff's case as to liability.
One is also struck, in looking over the data, by several innocuous
comments made in closing arguments which were remembered and fa-
vorably discussed by the jurors. Thus one juror in a wrongful death
case was fascinated for some reason by an easily conceived and totally
unimportant explanation given by plaintiff's counsel of how a certain
portion of the highway happened to be discolored (the juror spent several
minutes of his personal interview commenting on the point) while an-
other was greatly impressed with the argument of one of defense counsel
that he wanted to speak to the jury as a "friend and neighbor" and not
as a lawyer. A Thomas (FELA) juror spent several minutes discussing
a comment by defense counsel that "[State X citizens] may not be the
17. See note 4 supra.
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smoothest people in the world, but you can't put anything over on us."
The juror added: "And how true that is." Several Sutter18 jurors
thought highly of defense counsel's strategy of moving his hand up and
down seven times, to indicate how little time plaintiff allowed himself to
cross the intersection where he was hit by defendant's truck. And two
jurors in Phillips #2 were infatuated with a highly confusing, indeed un-
intelligible, explanation of precisely why defendant's employee did not
see a properly lighted truck before smashing directly into the rear of it.
A related point also bears mention. There was a striking lack of
correspondence in Sutter between the jurors' impressions of one of the
closing arguments and the reactions of the judge and other disinterested
lawyers present at the trial. The argument in question was given by
junior counsel for plaintiff, a young man who had not theretofore actively
participated in the trial. The first time the jurors heard him speak was
when he rose to address them in argument. And, so far as the judge and
disinterested lawyers were concerned, the argument was a masterpiece.
Plaintiff had an extremely weak case and yet it sounded, if you allowed
yourself to drift along, like a clear-cut case for liability. Furthermore,
you liked the lawyer and wanted him to win. Not so the jurors. The
"young boy" was "far too smooth." Indeed, it was almost as if the
jurors resented his presence as that of an outsider. As one of them
tersely put it: "It was a mistake to have him talk; he hadn't talked up
until then. Why, I was so surprised when he got up that I almost fell
out of my chair." In general, the jurors liked this lawyer least "as a
person" and "as a lawyer." He finished last in both rankings. It would
appear that a lawyer scheduled to argue should become acquainted with
his audience beforehand-for example, by examining a few witnesses.
One final point. The discussion has thus far dealt solely with what
the jurors themselves said they liked and disliked about the closing
arguments. No serious attempt has been made to appraise the various
arguments in terms of their actual impact on the jurors and, indeed, such
a task would be impossible. Apart from a few exceptional cases, the
arguments were too closely bound up with the evidence and with the
jurors' reactions to the lawyers' performances as a whole. Nevertheless,
it should at least be said, as bearing on the importance of closing argu-
ments from the jurors' standpoint, that their reactions to the lawyers
seemed primarily to be based on their reactions to the closing arguments,
and it was not uncommon for a juror to state that he liked a particular
argument either "the most" or "the least" of anything occurring during
his jury service. On the other hand, most jurors, when directly asked
18. The Sutter case is discussed more fully infra.
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whether they were influenced by the lawyers' closing arguments, replied
negatively, often adding that "we didn't need any lawyer to tell us what to
do." And to some degree, at least, such comments had meaning. This
is best shown by Phillips #*2 where plaintiff's counsel in closing argu-
ment expressly conceded his failure to establish that one of the several
defendants was liable. This concession was never mentioned in the de-
liberations. Indeed, the jurors exhaustively discussed this defendant's
liability and two jurors actually voted for liability and maintained this
position for more than an hour.
C. Other Aspects of the Trial
Of the "other things" referred to by the jurors as shaping their
opinions of the lawyers, the most important was lawyer rudeness or
supposed rudeness to the judge. This type of conduct occurred but sel-
dom, though when it did or when the jurors thought it did, the point was
almost certain to be made by them when describing their reactions. The
judge was respected and liked by the jurors and any action by a lawyer
carrying even the slightest suggestion of disrespect for the judge was
highly resented. The jurors expected the lawyers to defer graciously to
the judge's rulings and were irritated when the expected deference was
not forthcoming. The data are persuasive, particularly in Field, Grey and
Thomas, that it was extremely unwise for a lawyer even to challenge a
ruling, while sulking, as did government counsel in Johnson, was particu-
larly resented. Conversely, extreme deference and politeness to the judge
was frequently referred to as one of the reasons for liking a lawyer.
This was particularly true in Phillips #2 where plaintiff's counsel in var-
ious ways played on the jurors' respect for the judge, most memorably
by his favorable, closing-argument comments on the judge's wisdom and
learning and on the way in which he had conducted the trial.
The jurors also expected the lawyers to be polite and considerate of
the witnesses, even, it seems clear, in the case of an obviously biased or
lying witness. In Field, for example, several jurors unfavorably remarked
on the "meanness" of plaintiff's counsel to two of defendant's star wit-
nesses notwithstanding that both were regarded by the jurors as wholly
unworthy of belief. "He didn't have to act as though he was going to
kill them; we could see where the truth lay without his scowling and
yelling." The situation in Grey likewise bears mention. Defense coun-
sel subjected plaintiff, an attractive forty-year-old divorcee, to an ex-
tremely vigorous and sarcastic cross-examination, and, in the eyes of dis-
interested lawyer observers, succeeded (and could not otherwise have
succeeded) in casting grave doubts on her veracity. One juror resented
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the cross-examination in its entirety; counsel had no business upsetting
plaintiff like that. More significant, however, was the virtually unani-
mous consensus among the jurors that plaintiff's numerous testimonial
contradictions were to be explained on the ground that "her lawyer did
a bad job in coaching her." The assumption, in other words, was that
plaintiff was entitled to a certain amount of exaggeration and that it was
her lawyer's job to make sure that she got away with it. Although the
jurors expressed both sympathy and empathy with even the biased or
lying witness, the data unfortunately reflect an unhealthy juror-public
image of the lawyer and of the amount of perjury thought by citizens
to be committed in our courts. The evidence supports the claim, fre-
quently advanced in the jury-debate literature," that juries are good (or
bad), because they are better able to sympathize with and to understand a
witness' position than judges.
It is, however, not to be supposed that the jurors generally felt that
vigorous cross-examination has no place in a trial. Rather they deplored
any excess and that there was usually (though by no means always) a cer-
tain degree of sympathy for the witness. The typical reaction to such an
examination was mixed. The juror sympathized with the witness yet
respected the lawyer for his ability to get "the whole truth" and rather
enjoyed the drama. Overall, the jurors viewed the cross-examination as
an extremely unpleasant ordeal for the witness and particularly so for
witnesses who were also litigants. The data further suggest, as does
common sense, that in some instances counsel would be well advised not
to cross-examine a witness at all. Thus the failure of defense counsel in
Field to cross-examine the widow-plaintiff in a wrongful death action
was very favorably regarded by the jurors. Such restraint showed that
counsel were "real gentlemen," notwithstanding their otherwise objec-
tionable trial strategy.
Comparatively few points remain. One is that the jurors had little
use for extended and searching voir dire examinations. While the sub-
ject is dealt with elsewhere at greater length,2" it should be noted here that
criticism was levelled at every lawyer who by any stretch of the imagina-
tion spent "too much time" or asked too many embarrassing voir dire
questions. From the jurors' point of view, the shorter the voir dire, the
more likeable the attorney.
19. See, e.g., the various authorities cited in Broeder, The Functions of the Jury:
Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cni. L. REV. 386 (1954).
20. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REV.
503, 526 (1965).
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Another point, also the subject of attention elsewhere,2' is that most
jurors expressed indignation at not being told of the size of plaintiff's
damage request until plaintiff's closing argument. This only happened
twice [Turner and Peters] but plaintiff suffered dearly in each instance.
[Ordinarily, the jurors were told in plaintiff's opening statement.]
Mainly, the resentment was felt simply because plaintiff's ad damnum
was generally regarded as vital data, lacking which, the jurors felt they
were "still outsiders and didn't really know what the case was all about."
The data from Thomas, Peters and Phillips #2 (all personal injury
actions) though inconclusive, even for the cases mentioned, cast light on
the question of whether jurors react differently to out-of-state lawyers
than to local counsel. Sometimes, it appears, they do. Defense counsel
in Thomas, it will be recalled, repeatedly referred to the fact that his ad-
versary lived and practiced in a distant metropolis, called him a "city
slicker" and contrasted "all of this" with his own local background. "My
father and his father before him were small town boys, practiced law
right here, and my brother now represents us in Congress." Plaintiff's
counsel, an extremely able attorney, replied with a general blast at his
opponent's character and strategy and spent several minutes lecturing on
the "evils of sectionalism"-"I thought we had ended such talk at Ap-
pomatox." Though the interchange appears to have had no effect one
way or another on most jurors, two jurors held defense counsel's remarks
against him whereas three others, and one in particular, were influenced
in defense counsel's favor and repeatedly characterized plaintiff's counsel
as "that city slicker."
The Peters data are more clear-cut. Seven of the ten jurors per-
sonally interviewed disliked plaintiff's counsel in part because he came
from a big city "where they have a lot of ambulance chasers. I couldn't
somehow get it out of my mind that he was an ambulance chaser." The
point also seems to have been made in conversation among the jurors dur-
ing the trial and again in the deliberations. Peters, unlike Thomas, was
a case in which defense counsel made no reference to his adversary's place
of residence; nor did plaintiff's counsel refer to the question.
Phillips #2 is noteworthy in this connection because of the strategy
of plaintiff's counsel in seeking to avoid any prejudice against him from
the fact that he lived and practiced in a distant city, the same city, in-
cidentally, where plaintiff's counsel in Thomas resided. Counsel spent
the last five minutes of his closing argument in praising the judge, op-
posing counsel, the jurors, the dignity of the proceedings and the State
21. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Nsa. L. REV. 744, 756-
60 (1959). And see the various authorities cited in note 16 supra.
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in general. "Nowhere have I been so well treated; nowhere have I met
so many fine people in so short a period of time." The lawyer concluded
by inviting the jurors to visit him whenever they were in "my town."
While the effect of these remarks is unknown, no juror mentioned coun-
sel's residence in an unfavorable way. Indeed, several expressed the
sentiment that "if I was ever in trouble, that's the fellow I want to repre-
sent me, thousand miles or no thousand miles." One juror, however,
opined that counsel's invitation for a visit was "certainly unnecessary."
Conceivably, whatever degree of prejudice may exist against out-of-state
counsel can often be thwarted by a few well-chosen words.
It is interesting to consider the number and variety of prima facie un-
important aspects of attorney demeanor and behavior apparently affecting
the jurors. Many of these have been noted. Defense counsel's unshined
shoes and baggy trousers in Thomas; the failure of counsel in Ford #2 to
object, and the failure of defense counsel vigorously to cross-examine
plaintiff; the refusal of defense counsel to cross-examine the widow-
plaintiff in Field; the successful objection of plaintiff's counsel to the ad-
mission of the x-rays of his client's knees, also in Thomas; the belated im-
parting of the damage request in Turner and Peters; the appeals by plain-
tiff's counsel to the supposed expertise of various jurors in Phillips #,22
and numerous others. The extent to which the jurors observed, remem-
bered and attached weight to such prima facie insignificant actions by the
lawyers, of course, is a persuasive index of the lawyers' importance in the
jurors' eyes. A few additional illustrations may consequently prove of
interest.
In Field, several jurors commented favorably on the "gentlemanly
conduct" of plaintiff's counsel in permitting the elderly woman court re-
porter to precede him to the bench in order to take down the proceedings
on an objection. The conduct of plaintiff's counsel in this regard was al-
ways contrasted with the "ungentlemanly" practice of defense counsel,
who, upon making an objection, would immediately stalk to the bench
and wave for the court reporter and the other lawyers to follow him.
Several Thomas jurors disliked (one of them intensely) defense counsel's
habit of running his hand through his hair and standing with his hands
on his hips. Such behavior showed his "cockiness." Defense counsel
was also said to have perspired too freely. Several Sutter jurors derived
immense pleasure from the inability of defense counsel at one point to
formulate unobjectionable questions. To the observer such inability was
real. Indeed, the judge himself felt obliged to formulate the proper
questions. But to the jurors, counsel was merely "putting on a show,"
22. See text at note 16 supra.
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"just being a lawyer." "He obviously knew better; I got a big bang out
of the incident." This, furthermore, was the general consensus of juror
opinion and the incident was several times discussed during the trial. Vir-
tually all jurors remarked on the pleasure the incident gave them when
asked to state their reactions to the lawyers during their personal
interviews.
Again, both in Grey and Field, several jurors commented adversely
on a lawyer's fidgeting and pacing up and down, and in Grey of one law-
yer's habit of nervously (but almost inaudibly) tapping a long yellow
pencil on the counsel table whenever his adversary's witnesses were testi-
fying. Several Phillips #2 jurors noted the apparent and almost studied
unconcern of plaintiff's counsel with the damaging testimony of his op-
ponent's witnesses. The jurors thoroughly enjoyed watching such un-
concern and contrasting it with counsel's subsequent and sometimes very
dramatic cross-examinations.
The data as a whole show that jurors pay extremely close attention
to the lawyers' facial expressions. The most interesting example has al-
ready been noted, namely, the reaction of the jurors to the surprised ex-
pression of defense counsel in Brown when the government sought to in-
troduce certain incriminating letters. Additional if less dramatic ex-
amples were found in other cases.
A final group of illustrations are drawn from the lawyers' per-
formances on voir dire examinations, a topic elsewhere discussed at
greater length.2" For example, the jurors noted and adversely commented
in Williams, a Mann Act case, on government counsel's peremptory chal-
lenge of one Marks "simply because he had been the foreman of an ac-
quitting jury. Mr. Marks was an extremely fair man; I felt that taking
him off was inexcusable." Similar data were forthcoming in Brown, a
Dyer Act prosecution, where government counsel challenged certain jur-
ors who had served on an acquitting jury and defense counsel challenged
a person who had served as foreman of a convicting jury. Adverse com-
ment was also forthcoming for the government's peremptory challenge in
Brown of a Negro "just because he was a Negro. The defendant was
also a Negro; it didn't seem fair to me." Challenging of Negroes by de-
fense counsel in two of the civil cases was likewise criticized.24 Nor did
the Field jurors like the practice of defense counsel in challenging a
venireman without asking her a single question.
Hopefully the moral of the data is clear: Jurors watch lawyers like
hawks.
23. See generally Broeder, supra note 20.
24. See Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19.
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IV. SUCCESSES AND BLUNDERS OF LAWYERS
Obviously, what the jurors said they liked and disliked about the
lawyers and about the degree of influence they had is only one way of
measuring their probable impact upon the decision. Often, for example,
what a lawyer did not do was as important as what he did; and what he
might have done never occurred to the jurors. Often, too, an important
and influential move by a lawyer-a brilliant cross-examination, for ex-
ample, or the production or the failure to produce certain witnesses-was
simply not thought of by the jurors as having much, if anything, to do
with the lawyer. Settlement strategy, of course, could not possibly be
known to the jury and the same is true of a-hundred-and-one other "be-
hind-the-scenes" moves.
While no pretense is made that the whole story of the lawyer's in-
fluence can be told-it could never be learned-added perspective may
perhaps be gained by a consideration of what, looking back over all the
data, appear to the author as the most brilliant and the most blundering
of the lawyers' moves. As would be expected, however, the mistakes-or
what appear in retrospect to have been mistakes-are more easily stated.
Brilliant strategy is most generally a question of piece-by-piece building.
The blunder in contrast stands out like a sore thumb. The presentation
is thus unavoidably lopsided.
A. Successful Moves
An outstanding example of influential and highly successful strategy
was the cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel in Drake of one of de-
fendant's three obviously capable and respected medical experts. Plain-
tiff's major complaints were a painful backache, nausea and loss of
weight and appetite. The defense was, and the expert in question testi-
fied on direct examination, that the backache was solely due to an osteo-
arthritic condition common to persons of plaintiff's advanced age and
that plaintiff's complaints were probably due to poor teeth. The cross-
examination in question went substantially as follows:
Q: What do you base your opinion on, Doctor?
A: On the x-rays I took and on the normal physical exam-
ination of his back.
Q: How long did this normal physical examination of his
back take?
A: Just a few minutes.
Q: You mean you just felt around his back with your hands
to see how he reacted ?
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A: In a crude way, I suppose you could say that.
Q: So you base your opinion entirely on the x-rays?
A: Not entirely.
Q: But almost?
A: Yes, that is only natural.
Q: And you say there's nothing wrong with him except pos-
sibly bad teeth and osteo-arthritis that had nothing to do
with the accident and which could not possibly have been
affected by the accident?
A: That's right.
Q: Now, Doctor, does an x-ray always show an injury to the
cartilaginous tissue? Just answer yes or no.
A: No.
Q: To the ligaments?
A: No.
Q: To the nervous system?
A: No.
Q: And would an x-ray always show an inter-vertebral disc
injury, an injury to this jelly-like substance between the
vertebrae (pointing) ?
A: No.
Q: And your examination consisted almost entirely of taking
these x-rays?
A: Yes.
This concluded the cross-examination. Redirect examination estab-
lished that there was not the slightest reason to believe that plaintiff suf-
fered from any of these suggested ailments. Recross was as follows:
Q: You still admit that your opinion as to Mr. Drake's con-
dition is based almost entirely on your examination of
these x-rays ?
A: Yes.
Q: But you maintain that Mr. Drake is not bothered by an
injury to his ligaments or to his cartilaginous tissue or to
his nervous system and that he has no inter-vertebral disc
injury?
A: That is right.
Q: But, Doctor, how on earth would you know that? All
you did was look at some x-rays which you admitted
wouldn't tell you and you felt his back a couple of times.
Broeder: The Impact of the Lawyers: An Informal Appraisal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1966
THE IMPACT OF THE LAWYERS
A: I know, that's all.
Q: You just know! That will be all.
There was no further redirect, plaintiff's counsel failed to cross-
examine either of defendant's two other experts (each of whom testified
substantially as the first), and there was not a shred of evidence in the
case that plaintiff suffered from any of the ailments suggested by plain-
tiff's counsel. Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence concerning the causal
connection of his ailments with the accident was extremely, almost piti-
fully weak.
The impact of the cross is dramatically shown by the fact that most
jurors expressed the view that it was "more than likely" that plaintiff
was suffering either from a nervous condition or from an inter-vertebral
disc injury attributable to the accident. Certainly this was the consensus
of opinion during the deliberations.
A dramatic cross-examination of defendant's chief medical witness
was likewise an important factor in bring about a resounding plaintiff's
victory in Phillips #2. On direct examination, the doctor, a prominent
local radiologist, testified that no pathology was apparent in any of the
x-rays he took of plaintiff's back, and that the "curvature of the spine"
apparent in the x-rays of plaintiff's expert was "only apparent, a distor-
tion caused by the position of plaintiff's body with reference to the x-ray
tubes at the time the pictures were taken." Plaintiff's counsel, on cross-
examination, not only extracted the admission that the doctor had re-
ported "a slight abnormality" in one of his own pictures to another of
defendant's doctors but, far more decisive, forced him to measure each of
his own pictures with a micrometer and to admit that each of the pictures
when so measured showed "some degree of curvature of the spine," and
that one of them had almost as great a distortion as that present in the
x-rays taken by plaintiff's medical expert. The fact is that it is virtually
impossible to take an x-ray picture of anyone's spine which does not show
"some degree of curvature." The doctor, however, did not so state and
the jurors certainly did not know it. The consensus instead was that de-
fendant's doctor had been "totally destroyed" and that there was indeed
something very seriously wrong with plaintiff's back. One of the jurors
commented that "up until then [the cross-examination] I had my doubts
but that convinced me that he [plaintiff] was bad off." Three others said
that the cross-examination was the turning point so far as the question
of damages was concerned. Although several jurors had sympathy for
the doctor and felt that counsel had gone too far in making him look like
a fool, eight jurors stated that the examination strongly influenced them
to increase damages. The jurors had the utmost sympathy for the doc-
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tor and felt that counsel had gone much too far. Yet the jurors were on
the whole likewise decisively influenced by the incident in favor of plain-
tiff's cause.
The cross-examinations of the doctors in Drake and Phillips #2
stand out. And while a considerable number of other highly effective
and influential lawyer examinations appear in the data, most of them
seem attributable to careful selection of witnesses and in general to the
lawyers' hard work and good judgment prior to trial-effective
deposition-taking, detailed investigation of the circumstances surrounding
the accident and so on. Illustrative in this category is defense counsel's
production and examination of a government chemist in Rose who had
tested a sample of deceased's blood taken from his body immediately after
the accident. Seldom, if ever, has a witness sold himself to a jury so
successfully. A man of twenty-seven, he looked no more than fourteen,
and the contrast between his appearance and his testimony was something
to behold. Though not conceited, he possessed considerable self-
confidence, high competence in his field and was more articulate than any
of the lawyers, all of whom were articulate. And counsel's direct ex-
amination was admirably designed to make the utmost of his find. He
led the witness on and on, had him explain the history of blood testing,
the numerous scientific experiments in which the chemist had participated,
the nature of the various scientific papers he had written, exactly how
blood testing is conducted and the accuracy of the tests. The jurors thor-
oughly enjoyed every moment he was on the stand and his testimony that
deceased was dead drunk at the time of the accident was certainly a major
cause of the jury's verdict for defendant. Perhaps it would have been
the same if a less impressive chemist had testified or if counsel had not
had him give a lecture. The interviewer's impression, however, was
contra-it was extremely difficult to get many of the jurors to discuss
anything but "that chemist who looked like a little boy but who really
knew his stuff and talked like a man."
Before turning from the lawyers' handling of witnesses, two other
incidents, both drawn from Field, should be mentioned. The first con-
sists in the calling by plaintiff's counsel of a large number of witnesses to
testify that defendant had not produced, as claimed, a certain tie-rod end
from defendant's tractor involved in the accident. While the fact that
defendant had brought in a different tie-rod was obvious from certain
pictures, the long string of plaintiff-witnesses testifying to this fact gave
more body to counsel's charge that defendant was "falsifying evidence
and being deceitful." The second point is a tribute to defense counsel,
who, in examining defendant's employee involved in the accident, man-
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aged to establish that the employee had himself been very seriously in-
jured. This caused the foreman of the jury-and probably its most in-
fluential member-to reduce damages in an odd process whereby the em-
ployee's injuries were balanced against deceased's death. Damages were
then awarded to plaintiff for the difference. Similar (what I have else-
where termed "scapegoat") 2  reasoning was used by several jurors in two
other personal injury cases.
So far as successful arguments are concerned, two examples will
have to suffice. The first is from Grey where plaintiff's damage case
was extremely weak; in fact, not one of her treating doctors appeared to
testify. Plaintiff testified that they were in Florida on a vacation, "be-
yond the reach of a subpoena." Counsel for plaintiff spent several min-
utes on this testimony in argument, his central, albeit implied, point being
that plaintiff could not be blamed for the non-appearance of the doctors
and that the weakness of his client's damage case should therefore be
overlooked. Three highly influential jurors bought the argument and
were instrumental in securing a verdict several thousand dollars in excess
of what the others wanted and what the judge and other disinterested
lawyers present considered proper.
The second illustration is drawn from Ford #2 and consists of a
single sentence: "Mr. Ford's [plaintiff's] driving record is excellent;
this was the first and only accident in which he has ever been involved."
There was no evidence that this was so; only the non-objected-to state-
ment of counsel in argument. In contrast, defense counsel made no ref-
erence to the driving record of defendant's employee nor was there any
evidence concerning such record. The liability decision could easily have
gone either way. The previous trial had resulted in a hung jury on this
issue and there was a sharp division of opinion among the Ford #2 jur-
ors. The importance of counsel's statement is seen from the fact that it
was a repeated theme of the deliberations over liability, that it was dealt
with and thought of as evidence and that it was frequently mentioned by
the jurors-including two initially siding with defendant-as one of the
factors influencing them to vote for liability. It was not, however, only
the statement itself that was important but the statement in relation to the
failure of defense counsel to object and to tell the jury of the driving
record of defendant's employee. Failure of defense counsel to object, in
other words, was understood by the jurors as an admission that the state-
ment of plaintiff's counsel was true and the jury's "lack of information"
as to the driving record of defendant's employee compelled the inference
25. Broeder, The Impact of the "Scapegoat" in Jury Trials: Some Tentative In-
sights (current issue of DuQUESNE L. REV. (1966).
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that it was not as praiseworthy as plaintiff's. The analogy, of course, is
to the previously discussed Brown and Thomas cases where the jurors
drew unwarranted conclusions from a lawyer's objections.
The final example of successful strategy is drawn from Phillips #2.
Phillips, a trucker, had sustained apparently minor personal injuries along
with considerable property damage to his tractor-trailer and cargo. The
property damages were covered by insurance carried by several different
companies and Phillips had also received a $2,000 workmen's compensa-
tion payment from his employer's insurance company. The companies,
then, stood in plaintiff's shoes to the extent of the payments made and
were, in fact, joined by defendants as involuntary party-plaintiffs. The
problem for plaintiff's counsel under applicable law was whether to tell
the jurors of the insurance company interests or to oppose any mention
of them by defense counsel. The former course was chosen, though not
without misgivings.
The wisdom of counsel's final decision was established beyond ques-
tion. While the matter is exhaustively discussed elsewhere,2" the basic
point is that the jurors, after once finding liability, automatically awarded
approximately $9,000 in stipulated property damages to the involuntary
party-plaintiffs and then dealt with Phillip's personal injury claim as if
nothing had previously been awarded to anyone. The result was an ex-
tremely high personal injury award. As one of the jurors put it:
I think we awarded more damages because of the insur-
ance companies. . . . We really began with our [personal in-
jury] verdict just as if that initial $7,000 or $8,000 [it was ap-
proximately $9,000] whatever it was, had never been involved
in the case. And when you have already awarded that much to
insurance companies, you have to give the individual some-
thing, too.
B. Blunders-Retrospectively Viewed
Nowhere do the data more clearly reflect the lawyers' importance in
jury trials than through the numerous obvious blunders found therein.
Perhaps the sequence of cases studied is atypical in this regard. More
likely it is not. Hindsight is an incalculable benefit in appraising a given
performance. Apparently intelligent moves at the trial become mistakes
and mistakes become gross blunders. But even so, the catalogue of
serious errors is surprising. There was little excuse for many of the
things which were done and not done, and there is much in the data to
26. Broeder, The Pro and Con of Interjecting Plaintiff Insurance Companies in
Jury Trial Cases: An Isolated Jury Project Case Study, 6 NAT. REs. J. 269 (1966).
Broeder: The Impact of the Lawyers: An Informal Appraisal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1966
THE IMPACT OF THE LAWYERS
suggest that victory lies not so much in brilliant cross-examinations, good
witnesses and argument as in the avoidance of some big blunder.
The presentation is in three parts. The first deals with what for
want of a better term may be described as a "legal blunder," a serious
error resulting either from lawyer failure to understand or properly to
use an important rule of law, to request some ruling from the court or to
appeal. Also included are situations where a lawyer failed adequately to
explain a rule of law to the jury. The second part catalogues serious
errors committed during the trial other than those covered in part one.
Many of these, of course, have already been noted such as the "red
heifer" argument in Drake. However, nothing is said of juror selection
"mistakes." These are elsewhere reported. 7 A mistake, as the term is
used here, means an error which could fairly, though not necessarily,
have been so regarded at the trial without the benefit of lengthy post-
verdict interviews. The third and last part is concerned with settlement
errors and here, of course, every "error" will likewise be counter-
balanced by a success when viewed from the standpoint of the other side.
1. Legal Blunders
The most obvious legal blunder was committed by plaintiff's counsel
in Stone, a railroad crossing accident case involving several plaintiffs
whose combined claims exceeded $100,000. State X law applied and the
circuit court of appeals had only recently decided that such law required
a directed verdict for defendant in any case where the uncontradicted
evidence showed that the driver of a car could, on a dry day, have avoided
a collision after observing the train. The decision, incidentally, reversed
a contrary ruling by the trial judge presiding in Stone. Plaintiff's coun-
sel had simply not read the opinion and his clients' testimony fell almost
squarely within it. It was a needless admission for the driver of the car
really had no notion of whether he could have stopped on a dry day; it
was not a dry day, it was raining and idy. He merely said that he could
in order to avoid the inference that he was driving too fast. The result
was a directed verdict for defendant. Furthermore, counsel was unable
to construct the only argument which could possibly have induced the
judge to deny the motion, notwithstanding that the trial was postponed
for an hour in order to allow time for research.
Of equal seriousness was the blunder in Thomas, an FELA case,
where defendant's two lawyers-affiliated with different firms-in-
advertently allowed the time for appeal to expire. Each lawyer thought
27. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REV.
503 (1965).
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the other was appealing and neither did anything. The full amount of
the judgment ($9,000) thus had to be paid notwithstanding that the
chances for a reversal were good. Plaintiff's counsel sought and re-
ceived an instruction that defendant's violation of the Boiler Inspection
Act and/or any one of several ICC regulations issued thereunder com-
pelled a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount of his damages with no
reduction for contributory negligence. The instruction was arguably
error.28  Interestingly, however, not a single juror paid it the slightest
attention. Plaintiff's counsel ran a wholly needless risk. Ironically,
then, the defendant lawyers' mistake in permitting appeal time to expire
precluded them from taking advantage of the plaintiff lawyers' mistake
in seeking a needless and erroneous instruction.
The error in White, a freak auto-pedestrian case, was only slightly
less gross. When plaintiff rested, her liability case was not, in the judge's
private view, sufficiently strong to withstand a motion for a directed
verdict. Defense counsel, however, made no such motion at this time
but instead put on his own witnesses who on cross-examination so bol-
stered plaintiff's case that it was adequate to compel a denial of a directed
verdict when defense counsel finally requested one after resting his own
case. To make this crystal clear: Defendant would have won on a di-
rected verdict had counsel made the motion at the end of plaintiff's case.
Furthermore, several jurors favoring a plaintiff's verdict at the conclu-
sion of the trial said that they would have voted for defendant had the
taking of testimony ended at the conclusion of plaintiff's case.
The error in Cooper consisted in the failure of government counsel
to request a specific instruction on the meaning of the word "induce" in
the Mann Act phrase "induce, entice or compel." The government was
clearly entitled to the instruction had a proper request been made. One
juror, who held out for a conviction for several hours, was positive that
she would have hung the jury had the instruction been given. She had no
use for defendant, desired scrupulously to adhere to the law and possessed
the courage of her highly moralistic convictions. She voted for acquittal
only after a long and bitter battle and then because of her uncertainty
over the legal meaning of "induce."
The failure of defense counsel in Drake to request an instruction
that the award was not subject to federal income taxation should also
perhaps be mentioned. While the decisions on the propriety of such an
instruction are conflicting,29 there was at that time no authoritative ruling
28. See the discussion and citation of authorities in GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 225-28 (1959).
29. Currently, the leading case, which collects a host of authorities on both sides
of the question, is McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960),
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in the circuit that the instruction was improper and, indeed, the presiding
judge in a later case actually gave such an instruction sua sponte. Be-
sides, negligence case defendants (unlike plaintiffs) are usually willing
if not eager to run instruction risks. In any event, the non-giving of
the instruction in Drake cost defendant dearly. The jury, after tenta-
tively agreeing on a verdict of $20,000, then increased the award to
$25,000 in some measure because they felt that the sum awarded was
taxable as ordinary income. A similar procedure was employed by the
jury in Grey, though the amount of the increase was not nearly so great
and there was no general agreement on the propriety of making it."
The remaining legal mistakes, though serious, did not, as it turned
out, affect the final result. Thus government counsel in Johnson, a Dyer
Act case, commented directly on defendant's failure to take the stand and
defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The judge, who reserved ruling
at the time, later privately stated that he would have granted the motion
had the jury convicted." Retrial would then arguably have been barred
by the double jeopardy clause. 2 Ironically, the jurors could not even re-
member the comment when personally interviewed.
Finally, there was the blunder of plaintiff's counsel in Turner which
probably likewise made no difference. Plaintiff was in the service at
the time of the auto-accident and thus sustained no wage losses or medi-
cal expenses. He was, however, incapacitated for a considerable period
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). See generally Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Per-
sonal Injury Awards, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 212 (1958) ; Note, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1951).
30. Of course, as Professor Kalven has many times pointed out, much Jury Project
data supports the proposition that such matters as taxes, interest and lawyers' fees (con-
cerning which juries have not traditionally and are not currently instructed) are used as
bargaining mechanisms through which jurors resolve their differences over the proper
amount of damages to be awarded. See, e.g., BLUM & KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PER-
SPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM-AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS 33, 35 (1965);
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1068-71 (1964) ; Kalven,
The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 163,
176 (1958).
31. Whether government counsel would have made such an argument had he not
realized that his case was probably already lost is unfortunately unknown. In most
cases, of course, such information could never be obtained; defendant's proof problem
would ordinarily be insuperable. This is why, I suspect, many courts have refused to
allow new trials where mistrials have been granted 'because of prosecution error. Cf.
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) ; compare United States v. Tateo, 377
U.S. 463 (1964). See generally Note, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 158 (1963). Why new
trials are not, as in England, barred when there is a reversal on appeal for prosecution
error is something I have never been able to understand. See United States v. Gilbert,
25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 1300-01) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834). Concerning the English prac-
tice, see Goodhart, Acquitting the Guilty, 70 L.Q. REv. 514 (1954) ; Williams, Report of
the Department Committee on New Trials in Criminal Cases, 17 MOD. L. REV. 454 (1954).
32. As I have elsewhere argued, the second clause of the seventh amendment, both
historically and practically, constitutes a far more appropriate vehicle than double
jeopardy for barring new trials in this and similar cases. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United
States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 516, n. 121 (1963).
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and the reasonable value of the medical service rendered to him by the
government was fairly in the thousands. The collateral benefits rule"3
would have permitted recovery of these items. Counsel, however, was
unaware of the rule and announced in his opening statement that there
was "fortunately no question of wage losses and medical expenses in the
case." And plaintiff's case was conducted on this basis throughout. The
reason it probably made no difference is that most jurors thought that
defendant was not liable and the jury rendered a verdict-after a bitter
twelve-hour deliberation-for a compromise $1,500. Had plaintiff's li-
ability case been stronger, however, the blunder would have proved costly.
For all six jurors personally interviewed stated that they would unhesi-
tantly have awarded recovery for the items had they known of the rule
and been told of the reasons underlying it.34 Lawyer unawareness of the
rule is probably widespread; plaintiff's counsel in Sutter-where the ver-
dict was for defendant-was similarly uninformed.
Counsel's failure to explain adequately the law to the jury had its
most telling impact in Brown, a Dyer Act case. But for such failure, an
acquittal instead of a conviction would possibly have resulted. While
the government's evidence was uncontradicted that defendant-in viola-
tion of a rental agreement and without making the required payment-
transported a car from one state to another and then abandoned it, the
court, erroneously as it later turned out," instructed the jury that the
government had the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had the intention permanently to appropriate the car to him-
self at the same time he rented it. On this latter point, the government's
case was very weak. There were no admissions by defendant regarding
his intention when he rented the car, no proof of the time he left the
first (or "rental") state or the time he arrived in the other state. It could
have been weeks afterwards. The rental agreement was blank concern-
33. This rule, almost universally recognized in the United States, is to the effect
that a tortfeasor is not allowed to mitigate damages because the injured plaintiff has
received benefits from third parties, health and workman's compensation benefits, for
example. The principal case refusing to recognize the rule in the United States is
Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962). Compare
Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E.2d 1 (1939) ; Motts v. Michigan Cab Co., 274
Mich. 437, 264 N.W. 855 (1936). See generally James, Social Insurance and Tort Lia-
bility, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 557 (1952) ; Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal In-
jury Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158, 169 (1958) (juries in general unhappy with collateral
benefits rule) ; Seavey, Effect on Tort Damages of Events Occurring Before Trial, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1237 (1953) ; Street, Supervening Events and the Quantum of Damages,
78 L.Q. REV. 70 (1962) ; Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964) ; Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 330
(1948).
34. Compare Kalven, supra note 33, at 169.
35. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957). Post-Turley cases are collected
in Riley v. United States, 359 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1966).
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ing the precise date defendant was to return the car and defendant had
previously rented cars from the agency and returned them on time.
Furthermore, defendant used his correct name and address in renting the
car and so could easily be traced while the car itself had distinctive
"drive-it-yourself" markings. Court-appointed defense counsel, extremely
conscientious but very young, nervous and inexperienced-this was his
first jury trial-stressed none of the above and wholly failed even to
mention-let alone explain-the point of law upon which an acquittal de-
pended. The jury convicted within a half-hour. Government counsel
himself thought the verdict to be wrong, taking the position that he had
not met his burden on the question of defendant's intention. Much of the
force of all this would be lost had defense counsel not known the content
of the court's instructions during argument. But he did. Counsel for
both sides were informed of the instruction told just prior to argument.36
Rose affords a second illustration. Plaintiff's intestate, while at-
tempting to cross a highway running through the center of a small town,
was killed by defendant's loaded cattle truck traveling approximately
forty m.p.h. in a twenty-five m.p.h. zone. Defendant virtually conceded
his employee's negligence, defending instead on the ground that deceased
was dead drunk at the time and, after standing motionless on the center
line until the truck was almost upon him, took three or four steps across
it and then leaped directly into the path of the truck in a befuddled effort
to avoid being hit. The only difficulty with this position was the un-
contradicted evidence that the truck was traveling very close to the high-
way's right shoulder until just before the accident when it swerved almost
to the center line, the approximate point of impact. Because of this and
because deceased never stepped across the center line until his last-second
leap, it was possible to avoid the effect of his drunken condition and
probable unsteadiness by arguing that his negligence, if any, was not the
"proximate cause" of the accident. The argument, however, was never
made; plaintiff's counsel never mentioned "proximate cause."
Several circumstances show that this was a significant blunder.
First, most jurors-including the most influential member of the panel"
-possessed an intense desire to disregard or "get around" the doctrine of
contributory negligence. They regarded it as unfair both to plaintiff-
36. As a further point of interest concerning court-appointed counsel (five of the
seven criminal cases involved them) none complained that he was serving without com-
pensation. Compare Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections,
17 HAST. L.J. 217, 220-21, 252-53 (1965), and authorities therein cited.
37. The term "most influential" juror as used herein means "most influential" both
as characterized by his juror colleagues and as pieced together by the author on the basis
of the juror interviews in toto.
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who was thereby deprived of all compensation-and to the community,
whose interest they felt required defendant and his employee to be "pun-
ished" for the latter's negligence. Furthermore, they resented being de-
prived of an opportunity to state publicly the basis for their decision-that
deceased's negligence barred recovery notwithstanding that defendant's
employee was equally, if not more, to blame. The community interest
demanded at least this much and it took a trip to the courtroom to estab-
lish that the law in its wisdom had mistakenly decreed otherwise. The
point, in other words, is that the jurors searched frantically for some
basis for granting plaintiff a degree of relief and for punishing defend-
ant and his employee for the good of the community. Yet they could
not find it-none of them had a firm notion of the meaning of "proxi-
mate cause," and most of them not the slightest notion although five
jurors were personally willing to take the law into their own hands, only
one felt able to do so in the face of the oath-violation charges repeatedly
made in the deliberations. The political situation in the juryroom required
a legal peg on which to hang a compromise. Had counsel supplied it in
the form of "proximate cause," the result would possibly have been a
verdict for plaintiff or at least a hung jury. The authority for this is no
subjective hunch. It comes from the jurors themselves, two of whom
emphatically stated that had they possessed the "proximate cause" peg,
they would then have hung the jury rather than agree to a defendant's
verdict. Several others said that plaintiff would have probably pre-
vailed. Furthermore, the most influential juror opined that the result
would doubtless have been a plaintiff's verdict for approximately $5,000.
While the data are by no means as clear, four interviews in Peters
(pedestrian plaintiff, auto-accident case) likewise support the view that
plaintiff's counsel blundered in failing to argue "proximate cause" in
that case. If Rose and Peters are any criteria, "proximate cause" doc-
trine has great potential as a device for defeating the contributory neg-
ligence defense.
The remaining example has been discussed elsewhere 8 and can ac-
cordingly be disposed of briefly. Illustrated both by Thomas and Drake,
the only FELA cases studied, the error was in the failure of defense
counsel to explain clearly to the jury the proper method for computing
damages. Most of the jurors in each case were in agreement regarding
plaintiff's contributory negligence and understood that plaintiff's dam-
ages had therefore to be reduced. However, instead of computing the
amount of such damages and agreeing even generally on the "percentage-
38. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 756-60
(1959). And see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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extent" to which plaintiff was responsible, they simply took plaintiff's
damage request and made amorphous individual deductions from such
amount. In both cases the practice probably substantially increased the
amount of the award.
2. Miscellaneous Lawyer Mistakes
While most of the serious and many of the not so serious non-legal
blunders have already been noted, a few still remain. The most signifi-
cant is drawn from Field, a wrongful death action, where, because of the
way in which the case was tried, the ultimate issue became whether the ac-
cident occurred in the north or in the south lane of a highway. And on
this issue the defendant hardly stood a chance. Plaintiff introduced
strong circumstantial evidence that the accident occurred in the north
lane. Defendant's evidence that it occurred in the south lane consisted
almost entirely in the testimony of several alleged eye-witnesses, each of
whom was thoroughly discredited on cross-examination. If defense
counsel, instead of basing their case on apparently unreliable eye-witness
testimony, had taken the position that the accident occurred where plain-
tiff said it did and argued that it occurred there because of deceased's
negligence, the result-as regards damages-might have been vastly
different.
The error in Sutter was committed by plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff,
a private motorist, was seriously injured and sought $75,000 damages
which most jurors considered a reasonable sum. Defendant counter-
claimed for the $1,500 damage to its tractor-trailer. The verdict was for
defendant in both actions. The error consisted in counsel's failure to
stress the court's instruction that defendant's employee had the duty of
slowing down at the intersection in relation to the employee's express
admission that he had not done so. Had counsel stressed these items,
plaintiff's liability insurer would probably have saved $1,500.
A third mistake (probably the most common of any committed in
the civil cases) was the failure of defense counsel in many instances to
argue the question of plaintiff's damages or even so much as advert to
the question. Ordinarily, the reason they did not do so was a fear that
the jury would interpret the argument as an implied admission of liability.
And doubtless this is at times altogether sound strategy-but probably
not nearly as often as most defense counsel seem to think. Not arguing
damages in terms of dollars and cents leaves the jury with nothing to go
on but plaintiff's damage request. Plaintiff's request sets the entire tone
of the jurors' discussion of damages. The subject is dealt with else-
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where in detail.3 9
Finally, defense counsel in Meyer, a Harrison Act case, made no ob-
jection to the obviously incompetent and prejudicial testimony of a nar-
cotics agent that he approached defendant to buy dope solely because he
had been informed by state police officers that defendant was an addict
and had for some time been under suspicion by the officers for peddling.
The point was several times made in the deliberations as a reason for con-
victing defendant. But it was by no means decisive.
3. Settlement Errors and Successes
Though the nature of the settlement negotiations is known in a gen-
eral way for nine of the civil cases studied, in only one and perhaps two
can a lawyer be said to have seriously blundered. Concerning White, 0
however, there is no doubt. Defense counsel made a serious error in
judgment. Plaintiff's liability case was pitifully weak and $7,500-the
amount for which the case was settled just after the instructions to the
jury-would have been liberal had liability expressly been admitted. The
judge would have found for defendant and this was also the inclination
of a few jurors. The highest amount favored by any juror was $5,000,
most jurors favoring from $ 1,000 to $3,000.
Drake (FELA) only arguably involves a serious error of settlement
strategy. Defendant's final offer, which plaintiff and his counsel re-
peatedly refused, was $2,500. The verdict was for $25,000. The judge
and disinterested lawyers present would have given $2,000. Obviously,
defense counsel made an error in judgment; the difficulty, of course, is
that we are using hindsight. No other lawyer present, even after the
unfortunate comparison of plaintiff to "an old red heifer," thought in
terms of $25,000. The verdict is an object lesson in the difficulty of
prediction.41 From this standpoint perhaps, even the $7,500 settlement
in White was reasonable.
Drake involved other settlement highlights. Defendant's first offer
was $1,500 which plaintiff himself flatly turned down against the advice
of his then-counsel. This occurred on the morning of the day the case
was first set for trial and while the jurors were present and ready to pro-
ceed. Incensed with his counsel, plaintiff berated them and started a fist-
fight in the law library which was broken up by defense counsel. Plain-
tiff's counsel withdrew and plaintiff hired another lawyer who actually
tried the case. Defendant then raised the ante to $2,500. Of the $25,000
39. Broeder, supra note 38.
40. The White case is discussed earlier in the text.
41. The Drake case is discussed earlier in the text.
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awarded, however, plaintiff finally received only $4,000. He had signed
contingent fee contracts with lawyers of whom even trial counsel had no
knowledge. Litigation over the respective amounts to which plaintiff
and his various lawyers past and present were entitled dragged on for
more than a year, finally ending in the circuit court of appeals whose
opinion-which ironically appears to be arguable-broke fresh ground
in the conflict of laws area.
The settlement situations in Field and Phillips should also be noted.
Defense counsel's final offer in Field was $25,000; plaintiff's counsel
was willing to settle for $27,500. The verdict was for $52,500, later ad-
justed to $50,000 because of defendant's agreement not to appeal. The
failure of defense counsel to accept plaintiff's offer, however, while
costly to their client, can only doubtfully be branded as a blunder. The
verdict was the largest in the history of the district court's division, and
while plaintiff had an excellent case at the conclusion of the trial, defense
counsel were obviously trading on the substantial possibility-which never
materialized-that the jurors would know of and be influenced by the
$15,000 limitation on death action recovery in the state where the case
was tried, notwithstanding that the law of another state, which had no
such limitation, governed. On the other hand, the judge would have
awarded $40,000; several of the lawyers present, $75,000; and the lowest
amount favored by any juror was "from $25,000 to $30,000." Most
jurors favored $75,000, two of them $100,000.
The two Phillips cases afford still another settlement lesson. Plain-
tiff had an excellent liability case in both trials but the verdict in the first
trial unpredictably went for defendant and seems to have thrown every-
thing out of perspective. As reported by plaintiff's counsel:
In this case, our thinking as to the aggregate value of the
case at all times was in the neighborhood of $30,000. How-
ever, after the first trial, our sights did go down somewhat.
As I recall, we had received an offer of $8,000 at about the time
of the first trial which was, of course, turned down. After the
reversal by the Circuit Court, the company who insured the
Express Company, entered into some settlement nego-
tiations with us. However, just before the trial they wrote us
and advised us that they had come to the conclusion that the
accident was entirely the other party's fault and they would
make no payment. During trial, however, I received an offer
of $11,500 which I believe was made up of $8,000 from the
Express Company and $3,500 from the other defendant. This
was turned down and our demand at that time was $18,000.
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The case went to the jury on the basis of that demand and offer.
After the verdict, the insurance company attempted to
compromise the same and after the motion for a new trial had
been denied, made an offer of $25,000 which was categorically
turned down. They finally paid the verdict in full, together
with interest and costs.
The amount of the payment was approximately $30,000.
The verdicts rendered in the remaining civil cases studied surprised
no one and certainly not counsel. In Brown, for example, defendant of-
fered $900, the nuisance value of plaintiff's claim, which plaintiff's coun-
sel urged his client to accept. The verdict was for defendant. Rose and
Drake are similar. Ford, where defendant offered nothing, was ex-
tremely close on liability. The first trial resulted in a hung jury, the
second in a modest plaintiff's verdict of $7,500, most of which repre-
sented stipulated property-damages. Defendant had an excellent chance
of prevailing, gambled and after almost winning, lost. Generally speak-
ing, the data exhibit considerable sophistication on the part of counsel in
their ability to judge the dollar value of a claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach here, of course, has necessarily been anecdotal.
Twenty-three cases, furthermore, are not many cases even from which
to draw anecdotes. Nevertheless, it clearly emerges that jurors some-
times do try lawyers and that even such matters as lawyer facial expres-
sions and courtesy to elderly female court reporters sometimes have
weight. It perhaps also' bears repeating that the threshold of juror tol-
erance for objections and attorney-emotionalism was surprisingly high.
In closing, I wish to thank the extremely able presiding judge with-
out whose extraordinary patience and cooperation this undertaking would
not have been possible and to remind the reader that the data reported
here constitute but a small portion of the data generated by the Univer-
sity of Chicago Project on the impact of lawyers in jury trials.
If the reader has gained only small additional insight into the prob-
lem of the lawyers' influence upon jurors, this article's modest purpose
will have been served.
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